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B ased upon a brief and selective survey of the literature on 
local economic development (led), this paper analyses four theoretical 
aspects that distinguish “local” economic development theories from their 
“national” counterparts. These are: location factors, local public goods, 
active participation by a variety of private agents, and the multidisciplinary 
approach of led theories. This analysis could be used to design an 
academic discipline of led, which seldom exists in developing countries, 
and shed light on the objectives and roles of agents involved in ongoing 
decentralization and led processes in those countries. 
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Local economic development (led) theory and 
national economic development (ned) theory are 
well established disciplines that are taught in most 
universities in industrialized countries (Blakely, 2003). 
Although developing countries, particularly in Latin 
America, have a long tradition of  implementing 
regional policies, such as river-basin planning, tax 
incentives, regional development agencies, growth 
hubs and integrated rural development, which spawned 
an initial wave of  graduate programmes on local 
economic development back in the early 1960s, Latin 
American universities rediscovered an interest in this 
field as recently as the early 2000s. The decentralization 
processes implemented in many developing countries 
over the last two decades (Montero and Samuels, 
2004; Stren and others, 2002; Aghón, Alburquerque 
and Cortés, 2001; Oxhorn, Tulchin and Selee, 2004; 
and Rondinelli and Cheema, 1983) have contributed 
to this renewed interest. International development 
institutions are also paying attention to led, and 
providing funding for it, as shown on their specific 
Internet pages.1 Generally speaking, led issues in 
geographic areas (regions, counties, provinces and/
or departments) in developing countries are analysed 
through the ned framework without including 
distinctive local-development features. Moreover, 
government agencies operating at the local level, along 
with economic, social and political agents residing in 
specific areas, perceive that economic development 
  The author thanks Esteban Hnyilicza and an anonymous 
referee for their helpful comments, and particularly for drawing 
his attention to early applications of local economic development 
policies in Latin American countries.
1  For example, the World Bank (wb), Economic Commission of Latin 
America and the Caribbean (eclac), United Nations (un), the Inter-
American Development Bank (idb), the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (oecd), and others.
in those areas depends heavily on the interventions 
and economic policies implemented by central (or 
federal) government.2 This article seeks to form a 
bridge between current led and ned theories, by 
briefly surveying four additional theoretical aspects 
that distinguish local economic development theories 
from their national counterparts in the analysis of 
led issues.
The first of  these consists of  the location 
factors associated with specific geographic areas in 
an economy; most national economic development 
theories implicitly assume an economy’s territory to 
be homogenous. The second aspect is the nature of 
the goods and services provided by different levels of 
government, where ned theories implicitly assume 
that the influence of the public goods and services 
provided by government covers all geographic areas 
of  the economy. The third aspect is the role and 
participation of  specific agents living in the local 
areas. Traditional ned theories do not incorporate this 
explicitly. Over the last two decades, however, modern 
ned theories have given a more important role to the 
behavior of agents, although not necessarily linked to 
the local areas in which they live. The fourth aspect 
is the multidisciplinary approach to the analysis of 
led issues. In ned theories, the focus is on economic 
fundamentals and the workings of markets, institutions 
and organizations, irrespective of the geographic areas 
in which they operate. A brief and selective survey of 
these four aspects is presented in sections III to VI 
of this article. As a starting point, however, section 
II discusses some of the definitions of led found in 
the literature; and, lastly, section VII makes a number 
of concluding comments.
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The World Bank website states that: “Local economic 
development (led) offers local government, the private 
and not-for-profit sectors, and local communities the 
opportunity to work together to improve the local economy. 
It focuses on enhancing competitiveness, increasing 
sustainable growth, employment generation and ensuring 
that growth is inclusive. led encompasses a range of 
disciplines including physical planning, economics and 
marketing. It also incorporates many local government 
and private sector functions including environmental 
planning, business development, infrastructure provision, 
real estate development and finance.”
In various contributions from eclac (Aghón, 
Alburquerque and Cortés, 2001; Finot, 2001) and 
idb (Albuquerque, Llorens and Del Castillo, 2002; 
Llisteri, 2000), led is defined as: “the structural 
and growth process which, by making full use of local 
resources, leads to a continuous increase of the welfare 
of the people living in a local area or region within a 
country. The process includes three dimensions: economic 
(encompassing the means of production that allow local 
firms to make efficient use of local resources, generate 
scale economies and increase their productivity and 
market competitiveness); sociocultural (characterized 
by the social and economic network, in which local 
values and institutions support the led process); and the 
administrative and political dimension (involving local 
initiatives that create an appropriate local and business 
environment to foster local economic development).” 
In the economics literature and from the 
industrialized-economy standpoint (Blair, 1995; Bartik, 
1995; Bingham and Mier, 1993; and Malizia, 1985) 
led is traditionally defined as changes that affect a 
local economy’s capacity to “increase economic growth, 
generate employment and create new wealth for local 
residents.” A modern definition is given by Blakely 
(2003) and Blakely and Bradshaw (2002), who state 
that the led field is a combination of  disciplines 
and an amalgamation of policies and practices; and 
that today led scholarship is a small and growing 
industry in its own right. The led concept is based 
on four factors: (i) indigenous resources and local 
control; (ii) new wealth formation; (iii) new capacity 
building, and (iv) resource expansion. 
These definitions of led share several aspects 
that tend not to be explicitly included in definitions 
of national economic development. The first is the 
geographic location of the led process. Countries 
are usually divided, geographically, politically or 
administratively (see oecd, 2002) into different 
territorial levels or spatial units (such as states, regions, 
departments, provinces, districts, municipalities and 
so forth); and residents (economic, political and 
social agents) are identified with those territories. 
Greffe (2004) postulates at least three justifications 
for the local approach to the economic development 
process: one concerns the specific features of certain 
territories, which may affect the adequate functioning 
of spontaneous market mechanisms, or the policies 
formulated for an area without taking local features 
into account. Another involves the multidimensional 
nature of employment problems, which are usually 
presented as a mismatch between supply and demand. 
Thus, factors such as training, housing or mobility, 
health care, minimum-wage constraints and others 
can in fact only be identified and managed in a precise 
manner and close to the stakeholders involved, which 
means that initiatives must be planned, executed and 
coordinated at the local level. The last concerns the 
global-economy context of the countries, under which 
the local approach is justified, because it allows for 
greater synergy between the economic and social 
foundations of markets.
The second aspect of led processes relates to 
the provision of public goods and services at the local 
level.3 Governments use a variety of instruments to 
achieve the goals of efficient and equitable resource 
allocation in an economy, which entails providing 
public goods and services such as infrastructure (roads, 
bridges, etc.) and social services (education, health, 
etc.). Most of these “goods and services” are supplied 
locally, however, (Tiebout, 1956a) and mainly benefit 
the residents of the areas in which they are supplied. 
Thus, the difference between the public goods and 
services that affect residents in a country’s territories 
3  McGuire and others (1994), conceptualize local-development 
capacity in terms of three broad factors: citizen participation, 
community or local structure, and development instruments. The 
latter relate to local government policies and the supply of goods 
and services that support the led process.
II
definitions of local economic development (led)
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or spatial units and what the literature calls “local 
public goods and services” is another aspect that is 
not explicitly considered in definitions and theories 
of national economic development. 
The third specific feature of  led (in contrast 
to ned) is its explicit consideration of the role and 
participation of local residents (economic, political 
and social agents and citizens) in the local development 
process. Firstly, local residents demand goods and 
services from government (at all levels), to support 
business activities and reduce income inequalities 
in local areas. Secondly, through the activities and 
participation of specific agents, together with alliances 
and partnerships among agents in local areas, they 
can also help increase the supply of  public goods 
and services, boost local economic growth and also 
influence economic policies at the local and national 
levels (oecd, 2007). 
The fourth aspect that distinguishes led from 
the ned is the former’s multidisciplinary approach. To 
address the geographic-location or spatial dimension 
of the led process, the key tools for analysing the 
led process are drawn from the fields of regional, 
urban, rural and geographical economics. In contrast, 
the public-finance approach is used to analyse the 
provision of  local public goods; and tools drawn 
from political economy, sociology and psychology are 
needed to understand the actions and interventions 
of agents in the led process. The following sections 
deal with each of these four aspects in turn. 
III
Location, geography and regional economic 
theories as inputs for led theories
The starting point for understanding the relevance 
of  economic theories of  geographic and regional 
location for led is regional economic-base theory 
borrowed from regional economics. Andrews (1953) 
defines the “economic base” as the set of activities 
in a “region” (defined as a local geographic area or 
a specific spatial unit) which “exports” goods and 
services to points outside its economic boundaries, 
or sells its goods and services to outsiders. Based 
on this definition, regional economic-base theory 
postulates that the “region’s” economic growth is 
driven by growth in the “export activities” of  the 
economic base (Sirkin, 1959, Tiebout, 1956b, and 
North, 1955).4 In led theories, the set of factors that 
determine location, activities and economic growth of 
the economic base of a region5 come from the areas 
4  The economic base activities or basic industries of  a “region” 
are the set of “export commodities or industries or staples”. The 
non-base activities or non-basic industries of  a “region” consist 
of  “subsidiary industries” developed and/or derived from the 
economic-base activities, demand for which is determined locally 
by the residents of the “region” (North, 1955).
5  Taking market demand, its geographic distribution, and local 
resource endowments as exogenous, location theories (Weber, 
1957; Isard, 1956; von Thünen, 1826) and central place theories 
(Christaller, 1966) introduced transport costs and distance from 
markets as factors explaining the fixed and spatial distribution of the 
region’s (base and non-base) activities. Marshall (1890) introduced 
of the economics of location and economic geography 
(both traditional and new). These factors include: 
external factors not localized in the “region”, local 
resource endowments (human, natural and capital) 
the concept of “external or spatial economies” associated with 
the proximity of economic actors within a given location. Such 
economies arise from three types of  cost and market-location 
advantages: job creation and the capacity to absorb workers 
with specialized skills, who are attracted to local areas and form 
a supply pool of  workers; creation of demand for (specialized 
and complementary) inputs which are profitable to produce, 
given the proximity of production markets; and the generation 
of technological spillovers via the exchange of information and 
production methods among firms located in the same spatial 
unit. Weber (1957) introduced the concept of  “agglomeration 
economies” which arise from transaction cost savings stemming 
from the proximity of firms within a specific area; and “external 
economies of scale”, also introduced by Marshall (1890), which 
are defined as the cost savings accruing to a firm because of 
the size or growth of output of  the industry as a whole. Such 
economies contrast directly with internal scale economies, which 
are a source of increasing returns based on larger plant size. These 
external economies are essentially spatial externalities, which can 
generally be defined as economic side-effects of  the proximity 
between economic actors. They can be negative or positive, static 
or dynamic, pecuniary or technological. The static variety is 
reversible, whereas dynamic externalities are associated with the 
technological progress, greater specialization, and division of labour 
that accompanies and/or drives growth and development (Young 
1928). Pecuniary externalities are internalized thorough market 
mechanisms whereas technological ones are not, although they 
may be internalized through non-market mechanisms.
53
fRoM nAtIonAL to LoCAL EConoMIC DEVELoPMEnt: thEoREtICAL IssuEs  •  MARIo D. tELLo
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 2  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 1 0
and physical infrastructure, together with factors 
such as distance from markets (where the economic 
base’s export demand comes from); transport costs 
(which affect production features of the goods and 
services produced in the economic base and the spatial 
distribution of the production of those goods and 
services); spatial (or external) agglomerations; and 
external economies of scale.
In a series of papers (Fujita and Krugman, 1995, 
Fujita and Mori, 1997; Fujit, Krugman and Mori, 
1999; and Stahl, 1987), the new economic geography 
theories put forward by Krugman (1991) and Fujita 
(1988) have introduced all these concepts in a formal 
way (using rational optimizing decisions by agents, 
interactions among agents, skilled labour and capital 
mobility in a general equilibrium framework), allowing 
for the endogenous location of manufacturing and 
agriculture activities and explaining the agglomeration 
of activities around cities and the economic growth 
of the regions. The agglomeration of consumer and 
producer activities in a given spatial unit is formally 
shown as the outcome of two forces: centripetal or push 
forces, and centrifugal, dispersion or expulsion forces. 
The first of these stems from spatial, agglomeration, 
and external scale economies and the creation and 
development of  backward and forward linkages, 
or market-size effects. The second group of forces 
is generated by the immobility of  factors such as 
land and workers (factor rewards decrease as the 
distance from the agglomerated activities increases), 
fierce competition, and pure external diseconomies 
(Krugman, 1999 and Fujita and Thisse, 1996).
The led literature has formulated various 
mechanisms through which the agglomeration of 
economic (base and non-base) activities generates 
economic growth and development for the local 
region or spatial unit as a whole. The first is the 
income/employment-multiplier mechanism (Sirkin, 
1959), whereby higher income and employment in 
economic-base activities will increase the demand 
for goods and labour in non-base activities. A second 
mechanism, drawing on “staples and vent-for-surplus 
models” (Findlay and Lundahl, 1994), operates through 
the backward and forward inter-sectoral linkages 
generated by the economic-base activities when there 
are idle resources in the region. Multi-sector and multi-
regional growth models have been based on these two 
mechanisms of economic base led models (Loveridge, 
2004; Nijkamp, Rietveld and Snickars, 1987).
The third mechanism involves “external and 
agglomeration economies”, as sources of  the 
centripetal and centrifugal forces of the agglomerated 
activities in a region. Growth and development poles 
(Perroux, 1950, 1955, and 1988) and product-cycle 
development theories (Vernon, 1966) formulated the 
basic ideas, which were then formally modelled by 
the new economic geography approach (Fujita and 
Thisse, 2003; Walz, 1996; Baldwin and Forslid, 2000, 
Black and Henderson, 1999; Martin, Gianmarco and 
Ottaviano, 1999 and 2001). 
According to Perroux (1950), an economic space, 
conceptualized as a field of forces, consists of centres 
(or poles) from which centrifugal forces expel and to 
which centripetal forces attract. As a reason for such 
agglomeration, Perroux argued that dominant (leading) 
firms are comparatively efficient, and they can make 
effective use of innovations and thus expand their 
output by more than other firms. This effect would 
be propagated and perceived throughout society 
through a multiplier process. Hence, a polarization 
process is needed for the population at large to benefit. 
Perroux (1955) also postulated that economic growth 
does not occur everywhere at once, but manifests 
itself  in points or “poles” of  growth of  varying 
intensities; and it spreads through different channels 
with variable final effects on the economy as a whole. 
Consequently, a growth pole is an “aggregation of 
propulsive industries” connected to the surrounding 
(or peripheral) environment. It is a “set with capacity 
to induce growth [defined as a lasting increase of a 
dimensional indicator] in another set”. Perroux (1988) 
adds that the development pole is a “set with capacity 
to generate economic and social structures, whose 
effect is to increase the complexity of the whole and 
expand its multidimensional performance”. Based 
on the dynamic stages of  products or “product 
cycles” (Levitt, 1965),6 and evoking the leading role 
of specific and efficient firms in the creation of the 
6  Levitt (1965) distinguish four stages: (i) the stage of market 
development, or creation of a product before there is a proven 
demand for it and often before it has been fully tested technically 
in all respects. Sales volumes are low and progress slowly; (ii) the 
market-growth stage, when a product has survived its introduction, 
demand starts to pick up, and the size of the total market expands 
rapidly; this is the peak stage for any product; (iii) the market-
maturity stage, when sales growth has started to slow and is 
approaching the point where the inevitable decline will begin. In 
the two latter stages, products that are considered economic-base 
activities generate demand in subsidiary industries or non-base 
activities, and are “exported” to markets outside the spatial units 
in which they are produced; and (iv) the market-decline phase, in 
which the product starts to lose consumer appeal and a downward 
slide in sales sets in. Vernon (1966) called this the standardization 
phase, and it starts at the product-maturity stage.
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growth poles, Vernon (1966) argues that regions which 
are capable of producing at the market-development 
and growth stages of the product cycle grow more 
rapidly. The region’s capacity to produce in those two 
stages depends, among other things, on the degree 
of technological innovation among the firms located 
in the region, the region’s endowment of innovative 
firms and the income generated in the region. 
These ideas have been formalized by the new 
economic geography (neg) approach, in which the 
sources of agglomeration, the rate of technological 
innovation (associated with investment in R&D 
activities) and technological spillovers are modelled 
as the key mechanisms driving local economic growth. 
Furthermore, and as a result of  the local growth 
models of neg, regions are divided in two groups: 
central regions, which are the more developed; and 
peripheral regions which are less developed. Central 
regions produce goods included in the first three 
stages of a product cycle, while the peripheral regions 
produce at the standardized stage. These concepts of 
“centre and periphery” first appeared in the seminal 
work of Prebisch (1959). 
A fourth and related mechanism shared by neg 
models is the “circular and cumulative causation” 
mechanism generated by the “lock-in” effects of 
agglomeration (Fujita and Thisse, 1996; Arthur, 
1989). Under this mechanism, the set of  (usually 
differentiated final and/or intermediate) goods at the 
first two stages of the product cycle will be produced 
by innovative firms in locations where there is a 
relatively large and attractive market (measured the 
number of workers or consumers). But the market 
will be relative large and attractive if  a relatively large 
number of producers locate their production there. 
Thus, the concentration of the leading sector (usually 
manufacturing) in a given location is generated and 
reinforced through this circular and cumulative 
causation mechanism.7 The initial activity (usually 
with increasing-returns technology) and its location, 
which generate this mechanism, stem from lock-in 
effects caused by accidental or historical conditions 
(or events).8
While local economic development depends 
on location factors that fuel development in the 
economic base and region through mechanisms of 
transmission between the economic base and non-
base activities, local public goods and services and 
economic policies are also key ingredients in local 
development capacity.
7  A relatively large market is attractive for firms because of the 
potential demand that may exist for their goods (a relatively 
large number of consumers) and the availability of (particularly 
skilled) labour (many consumers also means many workers). Thus, 
firms will demand inputs and labour through backward linkages. 
Moreover, large market size results in lower prices and higher real 
wages, which may induce workers to migrate to locations where the 
leading sector is concentrated. Thus, firms will increase the supply 
and number of (differentiated) goods through forward linkages, and 
they will lower their prices in the locations where their goods are 
produced. According to Fujita and Thisse (1996), the backward and 
forward linkages of the circular cumulative causation mechanism 
turn increasing returns to scale at the firm level into increasing 
returns to scale for the region as a whole.
8  Increasing-returns technology may lead to multiple equilibriums; 
with economic conditions and random events determining which 
equilibrium actually occurs.
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Several issues arise when local public goods and 
services (lpgs) are introduced into the analysis of 
the local economic development process, three of 
which are analysed here.9 The first is the efficiency 
with which the central (federal) government provides 
lpgs. The second is the level of local government 
that can supply lpgs most efficiently. The third is 
the economic and social role of local government 
in the led process. 
On the first of these topics, the pioneering studies 
by Oates (1972) and Olson (1969) provided a starting 
point for the analysis of decentralization theory or 
fiscal federalism. Recent surveys of this strand of 
literature are contained in Oates (1999, 2005) and 
Bardhan (2002) among others. According to the 
Oates (1972) decentralization theorem, in the absence 
of heterogeneous consumer preferences, and if lpgs 
overflow the local jurisdictions in which they are 
supplied, the most efficient arrangement is for central 
government to provide a common level of public goods 
and services to all localities. In contrast, when preferences 
are heterogeneous and there are no spillovers across 
jurisdictions, local governments are more efficient in 
providing lpgs to their respective localities. In the first-
generation theory of fiscal federalism, Oates (2005) 
envisioned a setting in which governments at different 
levels provide public goods, whose spatial patterns of 
benefits are encompassed by the geographical scope 
of their jurisdictions. This allocation of lpgs is called 
a “perfect mapping” or “fiscal equivalence” to use 
Mancur Olson’s (1969) terminology.
Based upon (i) public-choice and political-
economy studies focusing on political processes and 
the behavior of political agents, and (ii) the extensive 
9  A fourth issue, which emerged in the 1990s and is partially 
discussed in this paper, is local governance, for which recent 
surveys can be found in Liou (2007) and Shah and Shah (2006). 
This issue concerns the various types of institutional framework 
that best enable governments to fulfil their economic role. It 
deals primarily with the failings of government institutions when 
intervening in markets. A fifth and related issue, not discussed here, 
is decentralization (in other words the transfer of specific functions 
from central government to local governments). Surveys on this 
topic are presented by Rondinelli and Cheema (1983), Litvack, 
Ahmad and Bird(1999), and Bardhan (2002) among others.
literature on information problems, the modern 
theory of  fiscal federalism (or second-generation 
fiscal theory) summarized by Oates (1999, 2005) 
analyses the workings of different political and fiscal 
institutions in an imperfect-information and control 
setting, focusing basically on the incentives that those 
institutions embody and the behaviour they induce 
from utility-maximizing participants. In this context, 
the first issue of whether to centralize or decentralize 
public activities is analysed from this new perspective; 
and the trade-offs between the inefficiencies under 
centralized provision of  public services stemming 
from more uniform outputs that fail to reflect 
divergences in local tastes and conditions, versus 
the inefficiencies of local supply resulting from the 
failure to internalize inter-jurisdictional externalities, 
are analysed from a somewhat (but not altogether) 
different perspective.
The pioneering work of Tiebout (1956b) is the 
starting point for the second topic, which is closely related 
to the first one. Tiebout argues that government levels 
are directly related to the set of lpgs that governments 
supply within their jurisdictions. He showed that, under 
conditions of high household mobility, households 
can optimally (and efficiently) choose the jurisdiction 
of residence that offers the lpg package that best 
suits their preferences. In contrast to this non-spatial 
allocation theory of lpgs, the Hochman, Pines and 
Thysse (1995) geographic or locational approach to the 
provision of lpgs postulates that their consumption 
entails transport costs. These costs increase with the 
distance between residential locations and the public 
facilities where the goods and services in question are 
available. Consequently, decentralization does not 
have to be based on the types of lpgs supplied by 
local governments, but could be based on territories 
instead. It has been shown that optimal provision of 
lpgs can be decentralized only through metropolitan 
governments supplying the whole range of lpgs over 
one or more appropriate territory.10 
10  The geographic jurisdiction of the metropolitan local government 
is a territory where the user charge collected from its residents, 
plus the corresponding aggregate land rent, is just equal to the 
IV
Local public goods, local government 
and led policies 
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The third issue is what most led practitioners 
have concentrated on. The starting point is the theory 
of the economic role of the government as formulated 
by Musgrave (1959) and Samuelson (1954). According 
these authors, efficiency, equity and (macroeconomic) 
stability are the three basic market principles on which 
the economic role of the government needs to be based. 
Consequently, market failures or distortions, such as 
the existence of public and merit goods, externalities 
and natural monopolies, have traditionally been viewed 
as market inefficiencies to be corrected by government. 
Income-distribution inequalities arising from the 
market allocation of resources is another area that 
requires government intervention in the economy. 
Consequently, market distortions and inequalities 
arising from the jurisdictional distribution of resources 
may be territorial features of the market; and central 
(or federal) and local governments share the role of 
intervening in the economy at the national and local 
level; while the goal of macroeconomic stability is left 
as an exclusive preserve of central government.11
Recently, Shah and Shah (2006) have summarized 
the evolving economic role and responsibilities of 
local governments since the Musgrave and Samuelson 
contributions. Using the traditional fiscal federalism 
approach, which is based on the market-failure and 
lpg- provision approach to the role of government, 
they classify the different expenditures, public goods 
and service provision and taxation responsibilities of 
government and assign them to three levels: central 
(or federal), regional (states or provinces) and local 
(municipalities and metropolitan areas).
Under the same market-failure and lpg-
provision basis for the role of government, the new 
public management approach focuses on what local 
governments should do and how they should do 
it better. From this standpoint, (central and local) 
government is viewed as the “agent”, and the population 
represents the “principal”; so its responsibility is to 
serve the public interest and create public value (defined 
by Moore (1996) and measured as improvements in 
social outcomes or quality of life). This approach also 
suggests a change in the way local government should 
fulfill its responsibility: from the top-down approach 
of fiscal federalism to a bottom-up approach in which 
cost of  supplying all the lpgs provided by the metropolitan 
government.
11  Watt (2006) and King (1984), among others, argue that 
stabilization and redistribution (usually through transfers) are the 
main roles of central government, whereas the local-government 
role is to allocate local public goods efficiently.
local governments behave as managers serving the 
people living in their local jurisdictions (Shah, 2005 
and Caulfield 2003). 
In contrast to these two perspectives, public 
choice theory and the new institutional economics 
focus on government failings rather than market 
failures. These approaches propose different ways 
of organizing governance to avoid the inefficiencies 
caused by government failures. The public-choice 
literature endorses the self-interest doctrine of 
government and argues that the various stakeholders 
involved in policy formulation and implementation 
can be expected to use opportunities and resources 
to advance their self-interest. Consequently, for local 
governments to serve the people’s interests, they need 
full local taxing and spending autonomy, and they 
must be subject to competition within and beyond 
government. In the absence of these prerequisites, 
local governments are likely to be inefficient and 
unresponsive to citizen preferences (Boyne 1998). In 
contrast, the new institutional economics postulates 
various orders of government (as agents) to serve the 
interests of citizens (as principals). The jurisdictional 
design should ensure that these agents serve the 
public interest while minimizing transaction costs 
for the principals (Williamson, 1985; Horn, 1997 
and Shah, 2005).
Similar to the previous two approaches, the 
network form of  governance is also concerned 
with the institutional arrangements of government, 
while focusing on both market and government 
failures. It provides specific guidance in dealing with 
government failures in a hierarchical form of public 
governance, and local government involvement in a 
partnership with multiple organizations. Under this 
perspective, a network mechanism of  governance 
has been advanced for local governments, based 
on trust, loyalty and reciprocity between partners 
with no formal institutional safeguards. Networks 
formed on the basis of shared interests (interest-based 
networks) can provide a stable form of governance 
provided their membership is limited to partners 
that can make significant resource contributions and 
there is a balance of powers between members. Local 
government may thus have an opportunity to serve as 
a catalyst in facilitating the roles of both interest-based 
and hope-based networks to improve social outcomes 
for local residents (Dollery and Wallis 2001).
A more proactive approach to the role of the 
local government is formulated in the led literature 
summarized by Liou (2007), Bartik (1995 and 2003), 
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Bachtler and Yuill (2001), Blair (1999) and Blackely 
and Bradshaw (2002), among others. In addition to the 
traditional and modern theories of the economic role 
and responsibilities of local government summarized 
in Shah and Shah (2006), led practitioners (from the 
United States and Europe) propose another role for 
local government, namely to implement policies that 
foster local economic development. The rational for 
this role is based on specific aspects of theoretical 
models of  led, which may be related to, or are 
claimed to be consistent with, the efficiency and 
equity roles of the traditional and modern theories 
of local government. 
According to Bartik (2003), local-government 
economic-development policy is defined as the special 
activities undertaken by local government to promote 
economic development. Activities referred to as 
“economic development programmes” fall into two 
categories: (i) providing incentives and customized 
assistance for individual businesses from which greater 
economic development benefits are expected; and 
(ii) strategic initiatives to alter more general tax, 
spending, and government regulatory policies to 
promote local economic development. 
Blackely and Bradshaw (1999), Blair (1999) 
and Bachtler and Yuill (2001) distinguish up to 
three “waves” of  led programmes and policies 
implemented by led practitioners in developed 
countries: the first wave, before the 1980s and based 
on location theories of led, dominated by (incentive 
and subsidy) programmes designed specifically to 
attract footloose firms from old industrial areas 
into growing regions; the second wave, during the 
1980s, based upon traditional and neoclassical 
regional development theories, dominated by local 
growth programmes (such as creating new businesses, 
increasing investment capital, developing incubators, 
and providing technical assistance); and the third 
wave, from the 1990s onwards, based on led 
competitiveness and cluster theories, dominated by 
policies aimed at providing an appropriate regional 
business environment, emphasizing public-private 
partnership, collaboration and coordination.
From the institutional standpoint of  local 
governance models, however, local governments are 
not the “principals” of the led process; instead, the 
citizens’ residents in local areas, in their diversity 
of composition and roles, are the “principals”, and 
their active participation is also a distinctive feature 
of led theories. The next section considers the role 
and participation of the citizen or private agent in 
the local economic development process.
V
The role and participation of local private 
agents in the led process
Various groups of  citizens or private agents 
(entrepreneurs, women, groups representing social 
capital, etc.) play multiple roles in the led literature,12 
and they affect the local development process through 
a variety of mechanisms. Entrepreneurship (Bates, 1993 
and Malecki, 1994), “intrapreneurship”(Pinchot III, 
1985) or entrepreneurship capital (Audretsch and 
Keilbach, 2004a) are the terms normally used in the 
led literature to identify one of the oldest mechanisms 
used by entrepreneurs and managers to generate 
12  For example: (i) governors (such as owner-authorizers, voters, 
taxpayers, community members); (ii) activist-producers (such as 
providers of services, co-producers, self-helpers obliging others to act); 
and (iii) consumers (clients and beneficiaries) (Moore 1996).
knowledge creation and innovation (Schumpeter, 
1934) leading to regional/local economic growth 
(Audretsch and Keilbach, 2007, 2005, 2004b; and 
Lawton, Glasson and Chadwick, 2005). Innovation, 
however, is not the only business activity that affects 
the led process. An oecd (2003) report summarizes 
activities and interactions among entrepreneurs in 
local areas that affect the area’s economic development 
and growth process. Entrepreneurs are sources of 
investment, savings, job creation, networks and agent-
coordination, which may enhance the development 
capacity of the local areas in question.
A second way a group of citizens can affect the 
led process is through social capital (Trigilia, 2001; 
Putnam, 1993). Although social capital (defined as 
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the level of interpersonal trust, civic engagement and 
organizational capability prevailing in a community or 
among group of citizens) is a feature of specific local 
geographic areas, the concept was originally conceived 
as having economic-development consequences at the 
national level (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; and 
Zabojnik and Francois, 2005). 
Moreover, as pointed out by Durlauf (2002), 
social capital also has an impact on issues relating to 
political participation (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999), 
development traps (Woolcock, 1998), human-capital 
formation (Coleman, 1988) and the efficiency of the 
judicial system (La Porta and others, 1997). In the first 
case, citizens’ investment in social capital might include 
membership of a social organization leading to better 
coordination and political actions within a community. 
In the second case, a lack of trust among citizens (or 
social capital) in a community could contribute to the 
persistence of development traps. In the third case, the 
trust and coordination dimensions of social capital 
may improve information channels, communications 
skills, and knowledge creation, transfer and flows, 
leading to human capital formation. In the last case, 
the efficiency of the judicial system may affect the 
level of trust among people and thereby encourage 
or discourage the formation of social capital.
Women are another group of  citizens whose 
participation has recently been discussed in the 
led literature (Blumenberg, 1998). Beyond the 
gender-inequality and social-exclusion issues in the 
development process (Weinberger and Jütting, 2001; 
Blumenberg, 1998; and Elson, 1998), gender issues 
and women’s role in the family also have been linked 
to other aspects of social development (as defined in 
Mokate, 2004), such as: poverty; fertility rates; human-
capital formation; household nutrition; infant, child 
and maternal mortality rates (Elson, 1998). In terms 
of women’s role in economic development and growth 
at the local level, the led literature emphasizes three 
roles: as entrepreneurs, as innovators (particularly in 
retail and service industries), and in forming social 
capital (Forsyth, 2000; and Molyneux, 2002).
Another way citizen participation can influence 
the led process is through local “partnerships” (or 
cooperation, collaboration, coordination or association) 
between two or more group of  agents (including 
institutions, community or private organizations, and 
government entities) sharing common development 
objectives that are location-based and operate 
within spatially defined social, cultural, economic 
and political relationships. Local partnerships are 
territorial entities by definition (oecd, 2007). Aside 
from issues relating to the definitions and forms of 
partnerships (such as vertical supplier or purchaser 
associations, horizontal and lateral governmental 
partnerships, and private and public partnerships, as 
listed in Camarero, Hernández and San Martín (2008), 
it is through their social-capital and local-governance 
features that partnerships can influence local economic 
development process (oecd, 2007).
The “trust” element in social capital may 
improve knowledge flows among the members of 
local partnerships (Jones, Kashlak and Jones, 2004) 
and overcome the market failures arising from market 
activities based on the partnerships’ development 
objectives and programmes (for the supply of public 
infrastructure); and the local-governance feature may 
make it possible to overcome government failures arising 
from the process of achieving development objectives 
(by providing stability in a turbulent environment 
caused by economic, social and political changes; 
and by improving market efficiency through adequate 
control and allocation of resources and responsibilities 
among partnership participants, as suggested in Walsh 
and Meldon (2004) and oecd (2001)). 
Active participation by these and many other 
groups of agents and entities —such as the economic or 
interest groups analysed by Gray and Lowery (1988); 
and the local developers analysed by Laukkanen 
and Niittykangas (2003)— is considered by led 
practitioners as a part of  any planning strategy 
to foster local economic development (Walsh and 
Meldon, 2004). 
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The fourth distinctive feature of led theories is their 
multidisciplinary approach to the led process. As 
shown in previous sections, led theories draw on a 
variety of disciplines (such as spatial and location 
theories, public finance theory and the theory of 
governance, among others). Nonetheless, these are 
considered separately to emphasize different aspects of 
the local development dynamic. Until the 1980s there 
was a consensus among led practitioners in terms 
of the various factors taken into account in the led 
process (Thompson, 1968). In the early 1990s, however, 
a set of led theories emerged with a multi-disciplinary, 
multi-dimensional or multi-factorial approach to 
the led process within a unified framework. Those 
theories have been associated with the third wave of 
led policies and local government programmes, and 
they highlight simultaneous interactions between 
various factors to achieve local development goals. 
Two of the most widely studied “modern” theories in 
the led literature are the regional/local competitiveness 
or “cluster” approach developed by Porter (1990) 
(surveyed, by Budd and Hirmis, 2004 among others), 
and the cluster-development approach (Rainess, 2003; 
Rocha, 2004; Enright, 1996).
Leaving aside the problems involved in defining 
the concept of competitiveness (Lall, 2001) and clusters 
(Martin and Sunley, 2003), Porter’s approach to 
led is based on his competitiveness diamond which 
contains four sources of the competitive or productivity 
advantages of national or regional economies. These 
are: demand conditions; factor (or input) conditions; 
firm strategy, structure and rivalry; and related and 
supporting industries, According to Porter (2000), 
“demand conditions at home have much to do with 
whether firms can and will move from imitative, 
low-quality products and services to competing on 
differentiation. In low-productivity economies, the 
focus is heavily on foreign markets. Advancement 
requires the development of more demanding local 
markets. The presence or emergence of sophisticated 
and demanding home customers presses firms to 
improve and provides insights into existing and 
future needs that are hard to gain in foreign markets. 
Local demand also can reveal segments of the market 
where firms can differentiate themselves. In a global 
economy, the quality of local demand matters far 
more than does its size.” 
“Factor inputs”, argues Porter (2000), “range 
from tangible assets such as physical infrastructure, to 
information, the legal system, and university research 
institutes that all firms draw on in competition. To 
increase productivity, factor inputs must improve in 
efficiency, quality, and (ultimately) specialization to 
particular cluster areas. Specialized factors, especially 
those integral to innovation and upgrading (a specialized 
university research institute), not only are necessary 
to attain high levels of productivity but also tend to 
be less tradable or available from elsewhere.”
On the other hand, the context for firm strategy 
and rivalry concerns the rules, incentives, and norms 
governing the type and intensity of local rivalry. Low-
productivity economies with are characterized by little 
local rivalry. Most competition, if present at all, comes 
from imports; local rivalry, if  any, involves imitation. 
Price is the sole competition variable, and firms hold 
down wages to compete in local and foreign markets. 
Competition entails minimal investment. 
Moving to an advanced economy requires the 
development of vigorous local rivalry. Rivalry must 
shift from low wages to low total cost, and this 
requires upgrading the efficiency of manufacturing 
and service delivery. Ultimately, rivalry must also 
evolve from cost alone to include differentiation. 
Competition must shift from imitation to innovation 
and from low investment to high investment —not 
only in physical assets but also in intangibles (skills 
and technology, for example). Clusters play a key 
role in these transitions. 
While the nature of rivalry in a given location 
is heavily influenced by many aspects of the business 
environment (factor availability, local demand 
conditions), the investment climate and competition 
policies set the context. Issues such as macroeconomic 
and political stability, the tax system, labour-market 
policies affecting the incentives for workforce 
development, and intellectual property rules and 
their enforcement, affect the willingness of companies 
to invest in upgrading capital equipment, skills and 
VI
The multi-disciplinary approach  
of modern led theories
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technology. Antitrust policy; government ownership 
and licensing rules; and policies toward trade, foreign 
investment, and corruption play a vital role in defining 
the intensity of local rivalry. 
Lastly, related and supporting industries refer 
to the local presence or absence of  suppliers of 
materials, components and machinery and equipment, 
together with related industries that support enterprise 
productivity and competitiveness (Porter, 1998). The 
level and rate of growth of productivity in a particular 
location, according to Porter (1998), depend less 
on what industries and firms compete on and more 
on how they compete. The sources of competition 
define the factors that influence how firms compete, 
thus affecting productivity and the led process in 
local areas. 
A structural variant of  Porter’s approach is 
the systemic competitiveness approach outlined in 
Meyer-Stamer, Altenburg and Hillebrand (1998) 
and Meyer-Stamer (2005), in which the concept of 
systemic competitiveness seeks to capture the political 
and economic determinants of successful industrial 
development. It refers to a pattern in which State 
and social actors deliberately create the conditions 
for successful industrial development. The concept 
distinguishes four levels: the “micro-level” of  the 
firm and inter-firm networks; the “meso-level” of 
specific policies and institutions; the “macro-level” of 
generic economic conditions; and the “meta-level” of 
“qualitative” variables such as sociocultural structures, 
the basic economic order and orientation, and the 
capacity of social actors to formulate strategies. 
At the local level, the vehicle through which 
specific geographic areas may become more competitive 
and achieve systemic competitiveness for successful 
economic and industrial development is a “geographic 
cluster” (Porter, 1996 and 1998). This is defined as a 
“geographically proximate group of interconnected 
companies and associated institutions in a particular 
field, linked by commonalities and complementarities. 
The geographic scope of  clusters ranges from a 
region, a state, or even a single city, to span nearby 
or neighbouring countries” (Porter, 2000). 
In contrast to the competitiveness approach to 
led, the cluster approach focuses on the way specific 
features of  clusters affect the led process, which 
are intrinsically associated with the “economies” 
and properties generated in a geographic location. 
Under the former approach, Porter (1990) and 
Meyer-Stammer, Altenburg and Hillebrand (1998) 
claim that competitiveness (and its cluster vehicle) 
can be also applied at the national level, and is not 
necessarily linked to the development properties of 
specific geographic areas.13 In addition to the factors 
that determine competitiveness locally, the cluster 
approach focuses on the following led features of 
clusters localized in specific geographic areas: linkages 
and interdependency among firms and activities within 
a given space (Feser, 1998b); externalities (including 
technological spillovers) and agglomeration economies 
arising from location (Feser, 1998a); the formation 
of non-market social networks among agents within 
the geographic cluster (Jones, Hesterly and Borgatti, 
1997; Powell, 1990); the innovation environment 
(Audretsch, 1998; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996); 
and path-dependency and lock-in effects (Kenney 
and von Burg, 1999; and Antonelli, 2000).
Location-factor and cluster-development features 
have been also associated with the emerging literature 
on (national and regional) innovation systems, 
learning and knowledge-based economies (Lundvall 
and Johnson, 1994; Morosini, 2004; Maskell, 2001 
and Cooke, 2001). In a knowledge-based economy 
—defined by oecd (1995) as an economy which is 
directly based on the production, distribution and 
use of knowledge and information— location and 
cluster features can serve as vehicles for knowledge 
creation and economic growth in local areas. In this 
regard, Cappellin (2003) postulates that the knowledge-
creation process is interactive and combinatorial; 
and that closer geographical proximity and greater 
cognitive proximity makes it easier to combine 
complementary pieces of knowledge and facilitates 
interaction between various complementary actors. 
Maskell (2001) adds that the cluster is considered 
the territorial configuration most likely to enhance 
learning processes. Lastly, Leydesdorff  (2006) states 
that the “dynamic of a knowledge-based economy 
has important consequences for the function of 
regions. The locales may serve as the incubators where 
production, innovation, and diffusion processes are 
closely coupled. The density of the local interactions 
increases the chances for “lock-in” and therefore 
the (co-)shaping of trajectories within the system. 
The density of the interactions within clusters and 
regions determines this capacity. Therefore, one can 
expect metropolitan regions to hold an advantageous 
position in the knowledge-based economy.”
13  Enright (1998), Raines (2001) and Camagni (2002) summarize the 
geographic or territorial aspect of the competitiveness concept.
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The decentralization process pursued by developing 
countries over the last three decades has generated 
a demand for conceptual frameworks to define the 
appropriate objectives and roles of  private and 
public agents in led processes. Unlike the situation 
in the industrialized world, led is practically non-
existent as an academic discipline in most developing 
countries. This discipline provides four theoretical 
approaches to the analysis of  the led process in 
developing economies, going far beyond the economic 
fundamentals, institutions and the market-failure 
approach of  national economic development 
theories. Thus, location factors, local public goods, 
active participation by diverse private agents, and 
the multidisciplinary framework of the led theories 
can help elucidate the necessary objectives and roles 
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